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Note
Walking the Constitutional Tightrope: Balancing Title
VII Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims
with Free Speech Defenses
David M. Jaffe*
Itis an unfortunate fact of our constitutional system that the ideals
of freedom and equality are often in conflict. The difficult and sometimes
painful task of our political and legal institutions is to mediate the
appropriate balance between these two competing values.'
Sylvia DeAngelis, an officer with the El Paso Police Depart-
ment,2 filed a sexual harassment suit pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' against the El Paso Municipal Police
Officers Association. DeAngelis based her claim on the contents of
several columns appearing in the Association's newsletter that
satirized DeAngelis and other women officers.4 DeAngelis
claimed that the columns, written by an anonymous author,5
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B.B.A. 1994,
University of Michigan School of Business Administration.
1. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
2. DeAngelis became El Paso's first female sergeant in October 1987, after
six years as a patrol officer and detective. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 473 (1995).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); see infra note 55 (quoting statute and
describing Title VII).
4. Four columns referred specifically to DeAngelis, while the other
columns in question referred to women officers in general. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d
at 595. In one column the author comments that he "remember[s] the good ol'
days when finding the criminal was more important to the patrolmen [than]
keeping [their] hair in place!" Id. at 594. In another the author asks, "Do you
remember when there were no women workin' the streets? (Ah yes, those were
the good days!)." Id.
5. "The author's [pen name] was R.U. Withmi. He wrote as a patrol officer
with nearly 20 years' experience 'combatin' crime.'" Id. at 592. Each column
by the author bore this disclaimer: "R.U. Withmi is a senior level patrol officer
whose article appears monthly. It does not represent the official position of the
EPMPOA, but presents a humorous satirical view by the author." Id. at 594.
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amounted to sexualharassment. Thejury agreed with DeAngelis6
and found that the articles created a hostile and sexually abusive
working environment.7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed, finding insufficient evidence
of sexual harassment to uphold DeAngelis's claim or to allow her
to recover damages.9
The DeAngelis case involved a claim of sexual harassment
predicated on written expression that allegedly created a hostile
working environment." Although the Fifth Circuit's holding
centered on the insufficient evidence supporting DeAngelis's
claim, the court also examined the tension between the
Constitution's First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee and
Title VII." Indeed, with the dramatic increase in sexual harass-
ment claims 2 filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
6. The jury awarded DeAngelis $10,000 in compensatory damages and
$50,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 593.
7. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (defining and describing
the elements necessary to establish hostile environment sexual harassment).
8. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 597.
9. The court concluded the columns were not severe or pervasive enough
to constitute an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Id. at 596; see
also infra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the objective test in a
hostile environment sexual harassment action). The court also noted that,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts of this case failed to be
compelling compared to other reported Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment claims. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596; see also infra note 84 and
accompanying text (describing the totality of the circumstances test).
10. For another example of a hostile environment sexual harassment case
where sexually explicit expression served as the basis of a Title VII claim see
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The DeAngelis court stated:
Where pure expression is involved, Title VII steers into the territory
of the First Amendment. It is no use to deny or minimize this problem
because, when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims
founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute
imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech.
DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596-97.
12. Sexual harassment claims have more than doubled since 1990. Judith
Waldrop, Sex, Laws, and Video Training, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1994, at 14,
14. Complaints filed with the EEOC grew from 6,100 in 1990 to about 12,500
in 1993. Id. Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment against Clarence
Thomas during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings publicized the issue
of sexual harassment and encouraged more women to report harassment
directed toward them. See Jeffrey P. Englander, Handling Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, CPA J., Feb. 1992, at 14, 14 ("[N]ot since passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has the nation's consciousness regarding sexual harassment
in the workplace been so abruptly and pervasively raised."); Kara Swisher,
Laying Down the Law on Harassment: Court Rulings Spur Firms to Take
Preventive Tack, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at H1 (stating that Hill's accu-
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Commission (EEOC), 3 commentators note increasing conflicts
between the First Amendment and Title VII.' 4 In essence, these
confficts force courts to walk a constitutional tightrope between
free speech and sexual equality.
This Note addresses the tension between the First Amend-
ment freedom of speech guarantee and Title VII hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims. Part I reviews relevant First
Amendment freedom of speech principles and the development of
the cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title VII. Part II describes prior attempts to reconcile the
First Amendment rights of free association and free speech with
the government's equally important goal of eliminating sexual
discrimination and harassment. Part III proposes a flexible
balancing test for courts to use when weighing a public
employee's 5 hostile environment sexual harassment claim
against free speech defenses. Part III also suggests some of the
factors that a court should balance under this test. This Note
concludes that maximum judicial discretion is needed to apply the
proposed balancing test to the fact-specific nature of sexual
harassment claims.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Several bodies of law interact whenever a court balances
freedom of speech with hostile environment sexual harassment
sations "acted as a lightning rod for the anger millions of women had felt about
the problem, but had rarely dared to express").
13. The EEOC is the administrative agency that interprets and enforces the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent equal employment legislation. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988) (containing the enabling legislation for the EEOC). The
agency investigates written charges of discrimination filed by persons who claim
to be subject to such discrimination. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78
Stat. 253 (currently 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988)) (detailing congressional
delegation to agency); see also WILLIAM F. PEPPER & FLORYNCE R. KENNEDY,
SEx DISCRUMNATION IN EMPLOYMENT: AN ANALYSIs AND GUIDE FOR PRACTI-
TIONER AND STUDENT 89-96 (1981) (discussing EEOC evolution, enforcement
power, and investigative scope).
14. See generally Marshall H. Tanick, Sexual Harassment and Free Speech,
BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 1995, at 25-28 (discussing the conflict between Title
VII and the First Amendment); infra note 120 and accompanying text
(describing other commentators' viewpoints on the issue).
15. This Note concentrates on the public employment context because
speech receives increased First Amendment protection in this area and an
increased likelihood of conflict with Title VII therefore exists.
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claims. Freedom of speech is rooted in the First Amendment. 16
United States Supreme Court precedent establishes clear
parameters defining this right.17 Conversely, Title VII is a recent
congressional enactment designed to eliminate discrimination and
achieve equality in the American workplace. 8 In the thirty years
since Title VII's enactment, courts have struggled to define the
extent of its prohibitions."
A. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH GUARANTEE
1. Freedom of Speech: Strong but Not Absolute
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." ° The Supreme Court
has determined that the FirstAmendment does not protect certain
speech because the speech is considered worthless or socially
harmful.2 ' Generally, however, the language of the First Amend-
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See infra Part I-A.1.-3. (describing some of the limits the Supreme Court
has imposed on free speech rights).
18. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964) (containing floor statements
concerning the inclusion of gender in the list of classifications the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibits).
19. See infra Part I.B.1.-2. (describing the initial judicial recognition of a
cause of action for sexual harassment and subsequent Supreme Court
expansion).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. The Supreme Court has developed several categories of unprotected
speech: obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing
a three-part test for identifying material that may be banned as obscene); illegal
advocacy, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
(holding the constitutional guarantee of free speech does not apply where a
speaker's words are used to incite or produce imminent lawless action); libel, see
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (holding the First
Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official misconduct unless he or she proves that
the statement was made with actual malice); hostile audience speech, see Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (holding that, if a speaker's words are
likely to lead to imminent violence, police may arrest the speaker if he or she
refuses to stop); or fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 573 (1942) (holding the First Amendment does not protect face-to-face
epithets directed at an individual that are likely to provoke violence or lead to
injury).
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992), the Supreme Court
discusses "sexually derogatory 'fighting words" while briefly considering the
constitutionality of Title VII. See infra note 105 (providing a summary of the
RAV. Court's discussion of Title VII). Whether this language creates a "safe
harbor" for regulating some sexual harassment without concern for the First
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ment prohibits the government from regulating the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea disagreeable or
offensive.22 Thus, if expression does not fall into an unprotected
category,' courts can uphold a regulation prohibiting speech only
if the government's reasons for prohibiting the speech or expres-
sive conduct" are unrelated to the content of the speech.25
Although the language of the First Amendment appears to bar
all government regulation of speech,26 the Supreme Court
traditionally has balanced the right to free speech against other
important interests that may infringe on this right." When
conduct contains both speech and nonspeech elements, for
example, a sufficiently important government interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element can justify limiting the accompanying
speech. Furthermore, individuals do not have absolute freedom
Amendment in a manner analogous to the fighting words doctrine is an open
question.
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). In Johnson, the Court
ruled a Texas statute prohibiting flag desecration was unconstitutionally based
on content because it prohibited particular conduct only if the behavior
seriously offended an onlooker. Id. at 414-18. A statute not based on content
would have protected the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, not
just when the destruction of the flag causes serious offense to others. Id. at
411.
23. See supra note 21 (listing the types of speech that receive no First
Amendment protection).
24. The Supreme Court first recognized that speech may be nonverbal in
1931. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (holding the
First Amendment protects certain forms of symbolic expression).
25. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
(upholding the conviction of a defendant who burned his draft card because the
state's interests in regulating the behavior went beyond preventing expression).
The Court in O'Brien promulgated a four-part test to aid analysis when speech
and nonspeech behavior occurs in the same course of conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherace of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
26. "An absolute right, by definition, is not subject to balancing [with other
constitutional interests]." JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 994 (1995).
27. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961)
(discussing the need to weigh the government's interest in passing a general
regulatory statute with any incidental limits on unfettered expression).
28. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). The Court refuses to
"accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:979
to speak whenever or wherever they please or to use any form of
communication in any circumstance. 9 A regulation may limit
the time, place, or manner of speech 0 if the regulation is content-
neutral,"' fulfills a significant state interest, and provides alter-
native channels of communication. 2 The government cannot use
a time, place, or manner regulation, however, as a pretext for
suppressing language or expression that is offensive.33
The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the
content-neutrality requirement for a time, place, or manner
restriction when the restriction is designed to combat the second-
ary effects of speech.' Thus, the government may regulate
certain topics of speech that have negative secondary effects so
long as the regulations further a substantial government interest
and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communi-
an idea." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
29. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
30. A time, place, or manner regulation limits when, where, or how speech
activity is conducted. A time regulation, for example, might limit expressive
activity to daylight hours. A place regulation may prohibit expressive activity
in a certain location. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182 (1983)
(holding that a ban on carrying signs and banners on public sidewalks
surrounding the Supreme Court building is an improper restriction on speech).
31. A content-neutral regulation limits speech on all topics. A content-
neutral time, place, or manner regulation, for example, might prohibit all
speech in a public park, and not simply speech on selected topics in the park.
"The principal inquiry in determining content[-neutrality... is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech . . . 'without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516,
2523-24 (1994) (defining content-neutrality in terms of the government's
purpose in regulating speech and adopting a broad definition of content-
neutrality).
32. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
33. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (overturning conviction of defendant for
disturbing the peace based on his walking through a courthouse corridor
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"). The Cohen Court noted
that "[t~he conviction quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of the
words Cohen used to convey his message to the public." Id. at 18 (emphasis
added).
34. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
(holding that cities can ban adult movie theaters within certain areas in an
attempt to control the secondary effects of adult theaters such as crime and
prostitution); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976)
(holding that a city's zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters in certain
locations did not violate the First and Fourteenth amendments).
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cation. 5 In addition, the regulation cannot merely regulate the
primary effects of speech.36 The key question courts must ad-
dress in such cases is whether the predominant intent of the
authority promulgating the regulation is truly content-neutral.37
The Supreme Court also has limited free speech through the
"captive audience" doctrine. Under this doctrine, the state may
regulate speech that others cannot avoid. Although courts
frequently invoke the captive audience rationale to protect
listeners in their homes, 8 courts also consider audiences in other
locations to be captive and offer them protection as well.39 In
general, the government's ability to restrict speech to protect
others from hearing it depends "upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner."
40
35. For example, in Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 54, and American Mini
Theaters, 427 U.S. at 62-63, the Court concluded that enough locations existed
outside of the restricted zones so as to provide adequate alternative avenues of
communication.
36. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that listener's
reactions to speech are a primary effect of speech, and not the type of secondary
effects the Playtime Theaters Court had in mind).
37. A regulation is constitutional only if its purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech. For example, the stated purpose of the ordinance
in Playtime Theaters was to "prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade,
maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of
[the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life.'"
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 90a). The
ordinance was not designed to suppress the expression of unpopular views. Id.
38. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484,487-88 (1988) (upholding a ban
on focused picketing outside a residence to preserve the well-being, tranquility,
and privacy of occupants inside the home, and stating "'a]lthough in many
locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to
hear,... the home is different") (citations omitted).
39. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (holding that
broadcasting has a special ability to reach into the home and therefore allowing
the FCC to consider the ease of such intrusion when prohibiting speech in
certain circumstances).
40. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
In general, if a listener is outside the home, the Court is unlikely to
recognize a captive audience argument. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (noting that
the target of focused picketing is "captive" because he or she is trapped within
the home and cannot avoid the unwanted speech); Pro-Choice Network v.
Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 405 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has principally
limited application of the captive audience doctrine... to those cases in which
the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or its environs."). The Court
in Cohen took a narrow view of what constitutes a true captive audience and
noted "'[wie are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject
to objectionable speech.'" Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. United
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:979
2. The Forum Distinction
The government's ability to place restrictions on speech also
depends upon where the speech takes place. In a public forum,41
only content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech
are valid.42 In a limited-purpose public forum43 or nonpublic
forum," however, the State's ability'to limit speech increases.45
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
Outside of the home, the First Amendment interests of an offending
speaker often outweigh the interests of the unwilling, offended listener, and
thus the First Amendment provides the listener with no protection against such
speech. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749 n.27.
41. Public forums are places "which by long tradition or by government fiat
have been devoted to assembly and debate." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Examples include parks, streets, and
sidewalks, "which 'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.'"
Id. (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (describing requirements
of a valid time, place, or manner restriction on speech). Courts use a two-step
analysis when the government promulgates time, place, or manner restrictions
on speech. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 16.47, at 1143. First, courts
seek to determine whether the regulation is an "attempt to suppress speech
based on its message." Id. A content-based restriction will be upheld only if the
court can find that the content is unprotected by the First Amendment or the
"regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal." Id. If no content discrimination is involved, the
court will go on to determine whether the speaker's interest in the speech is
"outweighed by the promotion of significant governmental interests." Id.
43. A limited purpose public forum is "public property which the state has
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
44. A nonpublic forum is public property "which is not by tradition or
designation a forum for public communication." Id. at 46.
45. In a limited purpose public forum, so long as the state retains the
public character of a facility or place, the same standards apply as to a public
forum and the government may impose only content-neutral time, place, or
manner restrictions. Id.; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)
(holding that a university, having made its facilities generally available for
registered student groups, could not discriminate among those groups on the
basis of the content of their speech without a compelling justification). The
state, however, may close the forum altogether to public expression if it chooses.
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. In a nonpublic forum, the government, in
addition to time, place, or manner restrictions, "may reserve the forum for its
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id.; see Cornelius v. NAACP, 473
U.S. 788, 808 (1985) (holding that a charity drive is a nonpublic forum and
therefore exclusion of the NAACP from the charity drive is constitutional); see
986
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In a nonpublic forum, the government can impose any reasonable
regulation, including content discrimination, as long as it avoids
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint.46
3. Limited Protection for Workplace Speech
The Supreme Court has formulated a two-part test to
determine whether the First Amendment protects speech of public
employees during the course of employment.4 Under the two-
part test, the speech must address a matter of public concern,48
and the employee's interest in self-expression must outweigh the
injury the speech causes to the interests of the government as an
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, § 16.47, at 1145-56 (explaining the
distinctions between forums and applying the rules to various situations).
46. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (stating that public officials'
opposition to speaker's views is an insufficient justification for suppressing
expression).
47. The Supreme Court's two-part test evolved through a series of cases.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 388, 392 (1987) (holding a
statement made upon hearing of the assassination attempt on President
Reagan's life addressed a matter of public concern and finding the employee's
interest in making the statement greater than the interest of the employer in
efficient public service); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983) (holding
a questionnaire did not constitute a matter of public concern and therefore
avoiding close judicial scrutiny of the employment practices of the government
official who dismissed the employee); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568, 574 (1968) (recognizing workplace speech could be most effectively
protected by balancing the interests of the employee in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State as employer in promoting
the efficient performance of its services, and holding a teacher's First
Amendment right to speak on matters of public importance may not furnish the
basis for his dismissal).
Before Pickering, courts held that a public employee had no right to object
to conditions placed upon the terms of employment, including restrictions on
freedom of speech. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1884 (1994). As
Justice Holmes stated, a police officer "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
48. Matters of public concern are at the core of the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. Such matters include political and
social issues and other matters of concern or interest to the community.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. Compare Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381, 388 (finding the
statement, "[Ihf they go for him again, I hope they get him," made by a Deputy
Constable upon hearing of the assassination attempt on President Reagan's life
a matter of public concern) and Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (finding a letter
written by a teacher to a local newspaper criticizing school-board policy was a
matter of public concern) with Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49 (holding that most
questions in a questionnaire concerning office policy circulated throughout an
office by a disgruntled employee did not constitute a matter of public concern).
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employer.49 Courts determine whether an employee's speech
addresses a matter of public concern by examining the content,
form, and context of the statement in question.50 When the
employee's speech does not relate to a matter of public concern, the
government as employer enjoys wide latitude in managing the
workplace without judicial oversight.5 Conversely, when the
employee's speech relates to a matter of public concern, the
employer faces heightened scrutiny in justifying the employee's
reprimand or dismissal.52 Ultimately, the state's burden in justi-
fying a discharge depends on the nature of the employee's expression.'
49. As a public employer, the state's primary interest is promoting the
efficiency of the public service its employees perform. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at
1884. In efficiently and effectively fulfilling its responsibilities to the public, the
government as employer must have wide discretion over the management and
control of its personnel and internal affairs. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51. But
a strong government interest often is not enough to justify infringement of a
public employee's speech rights. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-91 (finding an
employee's right to comment upon an attempt on President Reagan's life
outweighed the employer's responsibility to provide efficient public service).
50. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The various circuits have given different
interpretations of what constitutes a matter of public concern. In general,
courts use a broad reading of the term. See, e.g., Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d
1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a fire fighter's criticism of other fire
fighters is a matter of public concern); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire
Dept., 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1436 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that reading Playboy
magazine was expression relating to matters of public concern and citing cases
from other circuits in which the courts interpreted "public concern" broadly as
support for its holding). However, these broad readings are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's earlier position in Connick:
To presume that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every re-
mark-and certainly every criticism directed at a public official-would
plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a matter of good
judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism
offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a
public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints ....
461 U.S. at 149.
51. Id. at 146. Although dismissing a public employee for exercising free
speech rights of any sort may be unfair, if the subject of the expression is not
a matter of public concern, a court rarely will proceed to the balancing prong of
the test. Id. at 147.
52. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing
test courts use when the speech of a public employee relates to a matter of
public concern).
53. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150; see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of
Public Concern: The Perils on an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 37 (1990) (arguing that Connick seems to require that, to
comprise speech on a matter of public concern, a grievance may not contain any
trace of self-interest and must be a generalized political or social commentary
or demand for reform). Estlund points out that lower courts aggressively have
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B. EVOLUTION OF THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIM
1. Development of the Sexual Harassment Cause of Action
Under Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII" as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
upon an individual's race, color, religion, gender, or national
origin." Congress passed Title VII primarily to remove historical
barriers to employment and achieve equal employment opportuni-
ties for all workers.56 Ironically, opponents of Title VII added
gender to the group of protected classes in an attempt to defeat the
Bill.5" The Bill passed despite this attempt, however, and Title
VII has become a powerful vehicle through which workers can
address unequal employment conditions."
used this element to rid their dockets of public employee speech cases, and she
concludes that the Connick version of the public concern test explicitly discounts
the importance, and undermines the claim to constitutional status, of speech
based on the everyday experience of average people. Id. at 37 n.18.
54. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78
Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)).
55. Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII does not refer
to sexual harassment, but instead to discrimination based on sex. The cause
of action for sexual harassment results from the need to label the phenomenon
women experience in the workplace when discriminatory behavior affects the
conditions in which women work. Professor Carolyn Chalmers, Address at the
University of Minnesota Law School (Oct. 30, 1995).
Many states have passed civil rights statutes modeled after Title VII. In
Minnesota, for example, "[e]xcept when based on a bona fide occupational
qualification, it is an unfair employment practice... [flor an employer, because
of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, [or] sex... to discriminate against
a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading,
conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." Minn. Stat. § 363.03 (West
Supp. 1996).
56. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
57. The addition occurred without any prior legislative hearings or debate,
and was proposed by a Virginia congressman who opposed the entire bill, who
voted against the bill, and who proposed the addition in an attempt to stir up
additional opposition to the bill as a whole. WILLIAM F. PEPPER & FLORENCE
R. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 18 (1981); see 110 CONG.
REC. 2577-84 (1964) (containing the pertinent floor statements).
58. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (providing statistics on the
growing number of sexual harassment suits filed with the EEOC).
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In the first eight years after Congress enacted Title VII, courts
struggled to define a cause of action for sexual harassment. 59
Many district courts initially held sexual harassment not to be a
cause of action under Title VII.60 By passing the Equal Opportu-
nity Act in 1972,61 Congress acknowledged that eliminating
sexual discrimination in the workplace was in the national
interest.62 Thereafter, courts began to recognize sexual harass-
ment claims under Title VII.
63
As part of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress
broadened the definition of "employer" to bring federal, state, and
59. Because the House included "sex" in Title VII just one day before it
passed the Act, little legislative history exists to help guide the courts. See, e.g.,
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (describing
this limitation and the concomitant difficulty courts face in applying Title VII's
gender provision), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
60. See Tompkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.
N.J. 1976) (holding sexual harassment and sexually motivated assault do not
constitute sex discrimination under discriminatory employment practice
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding Congress
never intended courts to hold an employer liable for an employee's isolated and
unauthorized sexual misconduct toward another employee), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979); see also PEPPER & KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 18, (describing
the reticence of district courts in recognizing a cause of action for sexual
harassment).
61. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988)) (amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
62. A senator discussing the 1972 act noted that "discrimination against
women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that
it is to be accorded the same degree of concern given to any type of similarly
unlawful conduct." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). The
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported that despite efforts by the
courts and the EEOC, discrimination against women in 1971 remained
widespread. Id. at 8.
63. In Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated by
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a federal district court "held
for the first time that sexual harassment was discriminatory treatment within
the meaning of Title VII." 1 ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1994). In Williams, the plaintiff alleged she had been
denied equal employment opportunities in the Department of Justice because
of her sex. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 655. She claimed that after she refused
a sexual advance of her supervisor, he engaged in a continuing pattern and
practice of harassment and humiliation of her, including unwarranted
reprimands and a refusal to consider her proposals and recommendations. Id.
at 655-56. The court noted there was ample evidence Congress intended to
construeTitle VII broadly, and held the actions of the supervisor constituted sex
discrimination. Id. at 658.
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local governmental agencies within the scope of Title VII." By
extending the reach of Title VII, Congress intended the same
principles to apply to governmental and private employers
alike. 6
5
Before the 1980s, most sexual discrimination cases involved
only quid pro quo harassment, or the demand for sexual favors in
exchange for job benefits,66 and courts were reluctant to entertain
Title VII claims not involving the loss of tangible economic
benefits." In response to this reluctance, the EEOC on Novem-
ber 10,1980 published guidelines on sexual harassment that elimi-
nated the requirement that the sexual conduct threaten tangible
job benefits, thereby expanding the cause of action beyond quid pro
quo.6 _ In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit became
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see 1 LEX I. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 5.05[1] (1995) (discussing the extension of liability to governmental entities).
65. See, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331-32 n.14 (1977) (discussing
the extension of Title VII coverage to federal, state, and local governmental
agencies); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1971) (explaining
that state and local government employees have access to the remedies
available under Title VII); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1971)
(describing reasons for including state and local government employees within
the jurisdiction of Title VII).
66. Commentator Alba Conte defines quid pro quo harassment as "the
exchange of employment benefits by a supervisor or employer for sexual favors
from a subordinate employee." 1 CONTE, supra note 63, § 2.2; see also
CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-40
(1979) (discussing quid pro quo sexual harassment). Quid pro quo harassment
is not protected by the First Amendment because it is analogous to a "speech-
related crime." Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environ-
ment: A Primer on Free Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1993).
This Note, therefore, does not discuss quid pro quo harassment claims.
67. Typical is the reasoning in Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). The court
reasoned that allowing sexual harassment claims predicated upon noneconomic
or intangible losses would result in "a potential federal lawsuit every time an
employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The
only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have
employees who were asexual." Id. at 163-64.
68. The Final Guidelines on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676-74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(f)). The
regulations provide:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
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the first court to recognize a cause of action for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment6 9 in the absence of the loss of a tangible
job benefit or forced resignation.7 °
2. Supreme Court Expansion
The Supreme Court first considered a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim in the 1986 case ofMeritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson.7' In ruling that Title VII is not limited to "economic"
ing with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. (footnote omitted). As of 1995, the guidelines have remained virtually
unchanged. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995). The Supreme Court has held
that the EEOC guidelines, though not law, are "entitled to great deference."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
69. Hostile environment sexual harassment involves behavior that "simply
makes the work environment unbearable." MACKINNON, supra note 66, at 40.
An example of such behavior includes visually undressing and staring at a
fellow employee. In such circumstances, quid pro quo harassment need not be
present. Id.
70. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in
Bundy suffered continual sexual advances and propositions by her superiors and
endured sexual intimidation as a"normal condition of employment." Id. When
the plaintiff objected, a supervisor dismissed her complaints, telling her that
"any man in his right mind would want to rape you," and proceeding himself to
request that she begin a sexual relationship with him. Id. at 940. The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that sexual harassment discriminates in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment when an employer creates or
condones a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of
whether the complainant lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the
discrimination. Id. at 943-44. The court further commented that unless courts
extended the sexual discrimination cause of action beyond quid pro quo cases,
"an employer could sexually harass a female employee with impunity by
carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other tangible
actions against her in response to her resistance." Id. at 945.
71. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The plaintiff, Michelle Vinson, claimed that during
her four years of employment at Meritor Savings Bank she constantly had been
subjected to sexual harassment by Sidney Taylor, her supervisor, in violation
of Title VII. Id. at 60. She estimated that over several years she had
intercourse with Taylor 40 or 50 times, and that he fondled her in front of
others, followed her into the women's rest room when she went there alone,
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. Id.
The district court denied relief, finding that if Vinson and Taylor engaged in a
sexual relationship during Vinson's time of employment at the bank, that
relationship was voluntary and had nothing to do with Vinson's continued
employment at the bank. Id. at 61. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed, Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), but the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for further consideration.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
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or "tangible" harassment,72 the Court followed the 1980 EEOC
guidelines73 and found the claim actionable.74 Since Meritor,
employers violate Title VII when discriminatory behavior
permeates the workplace with such severity or pervasiveness as to
create a hostile or abusive working environment.7" The Meritor
Court did, however, set some limits to Title VII hostile environ-
ment claims.76 To constitute an actionable claim, sexual harass-
ment must be severe enough to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment.77
The severity of harassment required to sustain a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Meritor remained
unclear until the Supreme Court revisited the issue seven years
later in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.78 In Harris, the Court
72. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Court noted that the phrase "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicates
congressional intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women." Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
73. "In concluding that so-called 'hostile environment' harassment violates
Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and
EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right to work in
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id.
at 65; see supra note 68 (detailing EEOC guidelines on hostile environment
sexual harassment).
74. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. In recognizing the hostile environment sexual
harassment claim, the Court noted that "not all workplace conduct that may be
described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment
within the meaning of Title VII." Id. at 67. The Supreme Court thus remanded
the case for a determination of whether Vinson's accusations were sufficient to
establish a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination. Id.
75. Id. at 64-65.
76. Id. at 67. In support of limiting the cause of action for Title VII hostile
environment claims, the Court referred to Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Rogers was the first case to
recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work environment. Id.
at 237-38. Even the Rogers court, however, concluded that "an employer's mere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee" would not be severe enough to fall within the ambit of Title VII. Id.
77. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. An actionable claim of harassment, however,
does not exist if no "term, condition, or privilege" of employment within the
meaning of Title VII is affected by the harassment. Id.; see, e.g., Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210,214 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding a mechanic subjected
to harassment had no actionable hostile environment claim); Christoforou v.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
evidence of sexual harassment failed to constitute an actionable claim).
78. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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determined the extent of injury required79 before courts could
entertain a Title VII claim."0 In promulgating objective"' and
subjective82 components of the hostile environment cause of
action recognized in Meritor, the Harris Court held that Title VII
does not require a showing of psychological injury.s3 The Court
noted that courts must examine the totality of the circumstances
79. The Court determined whether conduct must seriously affect an
employee's psychological well-being or lead the employee to suffer injury to be
actionable as abusive work environment harassment. Id. at 370.
80. Id. In Harris, Teresa Harris's employer, Charles Hardy, made sexually
derogatory comments and suggested at one point that he and Harris "go to the
Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris's] raise." Id. at 369. Hardy also asked Harris
and other female employees to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket and he
threw objects on the ground and asked Harris to pick the objects up. Id. When
Harris complained to Hardy about his behavior, he apologized and promised to
stop. Id. However, when Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's
customers several weeks later, Hardy asked her, in front of the customer, "What
did you do, promise the guy... some [sex] Saturday night?" Id. Harris quit
and sued Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work
environment because of her gender. Id. The district court held, despite finding
that Hardy's comments offended Harris and would offend a reasonable woman,
the comments were not "so severe as to be expected to affect [Harris's]
psychological well-being." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991
WL 487444, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991). The court held that "[a]
reasonable woman manager under like circumstances would have been offended
by Hardy, but his conduct would not have risen to the level of interfering with
that person's work performance." Id. The court, therefore, concluded that
Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive work environment. Id. In focusing
on the employee's psychological well-being, the district court followed circuit
precedent, and the Sixth Circuit dffirmed. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 976
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
question of the necessity of psychological impairment as a prerequisite to the
cause of action. Harris, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993).
81. The environment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
82. The victim must subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive,
or a court will not find that the conduct actually has altered the conditions of
the victim's employment. Id.
83. Id. at 371. The Court reasoned that "[a] discriminatorily abusive work
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing
their own careers." Id. at 370-71. The Court noted that while Meritor was an
extreme example of appalling conduct which gave rise to a Title VII violation,
that case does not "mark the boundary of what is acceptable." Id. The Court
concluded that "[slo long as the environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, . .. there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious." Id.
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to determine whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive."8 4
3. Elements of Hostile Environment Cause of Action
An employee proceeding with a claim of hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title VII must satisfy several ele-
ments.85 As an initial matter, the employee must belong to a
protected class.8" In addition, the employee must endure
unwelcome sexual harassment, the alleged harassment must be
sexual in nature, and the harassment must affect a term, con-
dition, or privilege of employment." Success on a hostile environ-
84. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1995) ("In determining whether alleged
conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the [EEOC] will look at the record as
a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred."). The
Harris Court set out several factors to consider in the EEOC's totality of the
circumstances approach: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. The Court noted that while courts
may take psychological harm into account, no single factor is required. Id.
85. See Jana H. Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, New Developments in the
Law of Sexual Harassment from Meritor to Harris, Karibian and Steiner, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1995, at 23-36 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. H-524, 1995) (listing elements of hostile work
environment harassment and discussing some of the issues that arise in sexual
harassment litigation).
86. Both males and females may bring charges of sexual harassment
provided the harassment is based on sex. Carey & Mannion, supra note 85, at
25. Federal courts have split, however, on the existence of sexual harassment
of men by men or women by women. Jill Hodges, Same-sex Harassing: Judges
Struggling with Issue as Iowa Case is Pending in Appeals Court, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 13, 1995, at D1. Some federal courts have found that same-
sex harassment is not covered by Title VII because the Act is intended to
protect against gender discrimination and a person cannot discriminate against
someone of his or her own gender. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County
Supervisors, No. 94-1607, 1996 WL 10280, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996) (holding
that Title VII does not cover male-to-male heterosexual sexual harassment).
Other federal courts have determined that it is illegal, regardless of the sex of
the harasser, if a person is subject to offensive treatment because of his or her
gender. See, e.g., Roe v. Kmart Corp., No. 93-2372, 1995 WL 316783, at *2
(D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995) (holding that Title VII does cover male-to-male
harassment).
87. Proving that harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of
employment is often the most challenging element for Title VII plaintiffs.
RALPH H. BAXTER, JR. & LYNNE C. HERMLE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE 37 (3d ed. 1989). The following factors may affect the EEOC's
determination: whether the conduct was verbal, physical, or both; how
frequently it was repeated; whether the conduct was hostile and patently
offensive; whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or supervisor; whether
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ment claim requires proof that a workplace was permeated with
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" that is "suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.""
Finally, the complainant must establish a nexus between the
employer and the offensive conduct.89
II. PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE THE FIRST
AMENDMENT WITH SEXUAL EQUALITY
Conflicts often force the Supreme Court to address tension
others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and whether the harassment was
directed at more than one individual. Id. at 38. When the alleged harassment
consists of verbal conduct unaccompanied by physical action, pertinent factors
include: whether the alleged harasser singled out the complaining employee; the
relationship between the employee and the alleged harasser; and the frequency
and nature of the remarks. Id.
88. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65, 67 (1986)).
89. In many respects the nexus element of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim is analogous to tort law's "respondeat superior" doctrine.
When a supervisory-type employee possesses a great deal of authority, a court
is more likely to find that the supervisor speaks for and binds the employer by
his or her acts. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing tort law's vicarious
liability doctrine). Based on this premise, in the sexual harassment context, a
supervisor's acts may bind an employer more readily than the acts of a victim's
non-supervisory co-workers. See Englander, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing
employer liability).
The EEOC guidelines promulgate standards for employers concerned about
vicarious liability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)-(f) (1980) (discussing employer
liability for supervisors' acts). When a supervisor or other agent of the
employer is the harasser, the employer is responsible for his or her acts
"regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c). If there is
doubt whether an individual acts as a supervisor or agent, the EEOC, in
evaluating a claim, will look at the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the responsibility and job functions of the individual. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)-(f). When the harasser is a fellow employee of the
complainant and does not hold a supervisory position, an employer is
responsible when the employer "knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can be shown that it took immediate and appropriate corrective
action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). The EEOC suggests prevention is the best tool
for the elimination of sexual harassment, and suggests an employer take steps
to prevent harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f). Such steps include affirmatively-
raising the subject to increase awareness of the problem, expressing disapproval
of such conduct, developing sanctions for egregious conduct, and informing
employees of their right to raise the issue and how to go about doing so. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
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between First Amendment rights and various other state inter-
ests. For example, the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees90
utilized a balancing test to subordinate weak freedom of associa-
tion rights to the compelling interest of gender equality." The
Court, however, has not yet provided a method for analyzing the
extent to which a state's interest in eliminating sexual harassment
allows it to abridge speech rights. The Court, in deciding both
Meritor and Harris, determined the bounds of sexual harassment
within the framework of Title VII and did not address the First
Amendment rights of the alleged harassers. Lower courts
therefore lack Supreme Court direction in dealing with this
potential conflict.
A. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
In addressing a similar conflict between Title VII and First
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court inRoberts v. United States
Jaycees addressed the conflict between eliminating sex discrimi-
nation and the right to freedom of association.92 In Roberts, the
United States Jaycees93 challenged the application of a Minneso-
ta law9 that effectively forced local chapters of the organization to
admit women.95 The national organization claimed the Minneso-
90. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
91. Id. at 623-24.
92. 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984). Freedom of association is the "freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas [and] is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 26, at 1118.
Although freedom of association is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court's decisions indicate that this right is an indispensable
means of preserving other explicitly protected individual liberties such as
freedom of speech and religion. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
93. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts, the Jaycees
limited regular membership in the organization to young men between the ages
of 18 and 35. Id. at 613. Individuals or groups ineligible for regular member-
ship (mostly women and older men) participated in the Jaycees as associate
members. Id. Associate members could not vote, hold local or national office,
or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. Id.
94. The Minnesota Human Rights Act stated that "It is an unfair
discriminatory practice... to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a
place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability,
national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, or sex .... " MINN. STAT.
§ 363.03, subd. 3 (1994)).
95. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. The Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the
Jaycees began admitting women as regular members in 1974 and 1975,
respectively, when the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ordered them
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ta law violated the Jaycees' right to freedom of association." The
Supreme Court, however, held that Minnesota's compelling state
interest in gender equality outweighed the Jaycees' association
rights.9
7
The Court considered several factors when balancing the
Jaycees' association rights with the state's interest in eliminating
sexual discrimination.98 In measuring the strength of the group's
association rights, the Court examined such attributes as the size
of the organization, the organization's degree of selectivity in
admitting new members, and the organization's exclusion of non-
members from critical aspects of the relationship. 99 Based upon
these factors, the Court determined the Jaycees fell outside of the
category of relationships worthy of strict protection."°
After determining the strength of the Jaycees' association
rights, the Court turned to the state's interest in eradicating sex
discrimination.'' Finding the state's interest in this case com-
to do so. Id. at 614. When the president of the national association advised
both chapters that they were in danger of losing their charters for such
practices, the local chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights, alleging that the requirement of the national
organization that the local chapters exclude women from full membership
violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Id.
96. Id. at 615.
97. Id. at 623.
98. Id. at 619-21.
99. Id. at 621; see also Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (reaffirming the relevant factors of size,
purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the
relationship).
100. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. The Court determined that the Jaycees are
a large and unselective group because neither the national organization nor the
local chapters employ any criteria for judging applicants for membership. Id.
at 621. In addition, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings,
participate in projects, and engage in many of the organization's social
functions. Id. The Court concluded much of the activity central to the
formation and maintenance of the Jaycees involves the participation of associate
members. Id. The Court stated that determining a State's power to limit
association rights "entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments." Id. at 620. The Court noted the
dissimilarity between the Jaycees and an intimate relationship worthy of strict
constitutional protection and determined that the Jaycees therefore enjoyed
relatively weak association rights. Id.; accord Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
at 546-47 (holding the relationship among Rotary members is not the kind of
intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection).
101. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-24.
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pelling,0 2 the Court determined that the goal of eliminating sex
discrimination outweighed the Jaycees' association rights. °3
Because of the weak association rights involved in this case, the
Court's balancing was not difficult. The Court reasoned that
regulations serving compelling state interests that are unrelated
to the suppression of ideas and that cannot be achieved through
less restrictive means justify infringements on association
rights. 10
4
B. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Although mention of the potential conflict between freedom of
speech and Title VII appears in one Supreme Court decision,
05
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards' is the only federal case to
date that addresses the conflict in any significant detail.'07 In
102. The Court noted that the Minnesota Human Rights Act "reflects the
State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring
its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services." Id. at 624.
The Court held the Minnesota Legislature's goal is "unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression," and "plainly serves compelling state interests of the
highest order." Id.
103. Id. at 623.
104. Id.
105. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In RA.V., the Court
commented that "since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct ... a particular content-based
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within
the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech." Id. at 389. The
Court in R.AV. specifically noted that governments may regulate sexually
harassing workplace speech based on its inseparability from illegal discrimina-
tory conduct:
[Slexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce
a violation of Title VI's general prohibition against sexual discrimi-
nation in employment practices .... Where the government does not
target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory
idea or philosophy.
Id. at 388-90.
106. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
107. See generally Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in
Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995) (discussing whether Title VII hostile
environment litigation is on a collision course with the First Amendment).
The Supreme Court never has decided a case presenting a conflict between
the States' interests in freedom of speech and elimination of sexual harassment.
In Harris, the Supreme Court's most recent hostile environment case, the Court
chose not to discuss the First Amendment issue, even though Forklift Systems
explicitly raised the issue. Respondent's Brief at 31, Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (No. 92-1168). Forklift Systems, citing Texas v.
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Robinson, Lois Robinson claimed that her employer'0 8 created
and encouraged a sexually hostile and intimidating
workplace." 9 Robinson supported her claim with evidence of
extensive posting of pictures of nude women throughout the
workplace" ° and testimony concerning sexually derogatory
comments directed toward her."' Based on extensive evi-
dence,"2 the court found Robinson fulfilled her burden in
proving all of the elements of a hostile environment claim."
The Robinson court attempted to explain why the First
Amendment does not impede injunctive relief for a Title VII
plaintiff."4  The court first stated that pictures and verbal
harassment are not protected speech because they are equivalent
to discriminatory conduct giving rise to a hostile work environ-
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
argued that the broad reading of Title VII favored by Harris would punish
speech merely because a plaintiff found the speech offensive, a result forbidden
by Supreme Court precedent. Respondent's Brief at 31, Harris (No. 92-1168).
Forklift Systems further argued that Congress may not prohibit speech as a
secondary effect of Title VIrs prohibition against discriminatory employment
practices unless the speech is closely connected with conduct and has an impact
on a plaintiffs employment opportunities. Id. at 32-33. The Court ignored
these arguments in reaching its decision.
108. Jacksonville Shipyards ran several shipyards engaged in repair work
for the Department of the Navy. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1491.
109. Id. at 1490. From 1980 to 1987 women formed less than five percent
of the skilled craft positions at the shipyard, which in the words of its
employees was "a boys club" and "more or less a man's world." Id. at 1493.
110. Id. at 1493. The district court found that pictures of nude women
appeared throughout the shipyard in the form of magazines, plaques on the
wall, photographs torn from magazines and affixed to the wall, and calendars.
Id. These photos depicted women in various stages of undress and in sexually
submissive or suggestive poses. Id. at 1494. Foremen of the shipyards
condoned these displays and often displayed their own pictures. Id. at 1493-94.
111. Robinson testified as to some of the comments directed towards her
during her tenure at the shipyard. Id. at 1498. Some of the more egregious
examples included: "Hey pussycat, come over here and give me a whiff," "I'd like
to have some of that," and "The more you lick it, the harder it gets." Id. Male
co-workers also addressed Robinson as "honey," "dear," "baby," "sugar," and
"momma" on innumerable occasions in place of her real name. Id.
112. The court's opinion summarizes the offensive behavior occurring in the
workplace, the testimony of expert witnesses as to the effect of this behavior on
women employees, and the responses of the shipyard to sexual harassment
complaints, making over 125 findings of fact. Id. at 1486-1521.
113. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (providing the elements
of a hostile environment claim).
114. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1534.
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ment."5 The court next claimed that regulation of discriminato-
ry speech in the workplace is nothing more than a time, place, and
manner regulation of speech." 6 Finally, the court noted that
workers are a captive audience in relation to the speech that
creates the hostile work environment."' The court concluded
that the compelling governmental interest in eliminating discrimi-
nation in the workplace outweighed an individual's interest in free
speech."' Therefore, even if the speech is otherwise fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment, regulation under Title VII is
115. Id. at 1535. The Robinson court commented that "the speech at issue
is indistinguishable from the speech that comprises a crime, such as threats of
violence or blackmail, of which there can be no doubt of the authority of a state
to punish." Id. at 1535. In support of this proposition, the court cited Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987) (stating that the First Amendment
did not protect a threat to kill the President, but that commenting upon
someone else's attempt to do so is protected) and United States v. Shoulberg,
895 F.2d 882, 886 (2nd Cir. 1980) (holding that threats to intimidate witnesses
were not protected). The Supreme Court later promulgated the same argument
in dicta in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-90 (1992). See supra
note 105 (detailing arguments of the Court in that case).
116. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535. The court noted in connection with this
theory that the State must predicate a time, place, or manner regulation on a
legitimate governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, that
the regulation must be content neutral, and that the means of accomplishing
this interest must be narrowly tailored. Id.; see also supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text (discussing time, place, or manner regulations). Two of the
three requirements for a valid time, place, or manner regulation are easily
satisfied in Robinson. Eradication of workplace discrimination is more than
simply a legitimate government interest, and the method of regulation at issue
in the case is narrowly tailored to remedy the discrimination problem. The
court's reasoning in finding content neutrality, however, seems more tenuous.
The court held "[tlo the extent that the regulation here does not seem entirely
content neutral, the distinction based on the sexually explicit nature of the
pictures and other speech does not offend constitutional principles." Robinson,
760 F. Supp. at 1535.
117. Id. The Robinson court noted "[flew audiences are more captive than
the average worker . ... " Id. (citing J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J.
375, 423-24); see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing First
Amendment restrictions designed to protect captive audiences).
118. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536. The court noted that other First
Amendment rights, such as freedom of association and freedom of religion, have
given way to narrowly tailored remedies designed to advance the compelling
governmental interest in eradicating discrimination. Id. The court also noted
that an employer, without violating the First Amendment, can require some
employees to curtail their expression in the workplace in order to remedy the
demonstrated harm inflicted on other employees. Id.; see supra notes 47-53 and
accompanying text (outlining cases in which public employees have challenged
public employers on First Amendment grounds).
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permissible." 9
Although the court inRobinson thoroughly discussed the First
Amendment implications of Title VII, the discussion was not
central to the court's holding. Robinson involved harassing
conduct in addition to offensive expression. The court, therefore,
could have found an actionable Title VII claim even if it had
determined that the First Amendment prevents the remedy of
injunctive relief. Only if the basis of the harassment claim was
pure expression would the discussion of First Amendment issues
have been determinative.
III. A PROPOSED TEST TO BALANCE FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS AND TITLE VII HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
While many commentators focus on the potential conflict
between eliminating sexual harassment and the right to free
speech, 2 ° none has proposed a definitive test to harmonize the
two interests. Courts can create a suitable framework for
balancing free speech rights with Title VII claims by adapting the
Supreme Court's analysis in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.'21
Although the Supreme Court in Roberts balanced association
rights with sexual equality, courts just as easily can balance free
speech rights with the goal of eliminating sexual harassment.
In analyzing conflicts between a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim and the alleged harasser's defense that his or
her statements were a legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights, a court should use the following analysis. First, the court
should evaluate the allegedly harassing speech according to a
number of criteria, including whether Title VII is a valid time,
119. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536.
120. Compare Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-
Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481,491-
510 (1987) (arguing that the courts' adoption of a broad definition of "hostile
work environment" in harassment cases establishes a content-based or even
viewpoint-based restriction of speech that is inconsistent with the First
Amendment) and Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1819-43, 1849-62 (1992) (arguing that
harassment law does not fit within any First Amendment exceptions and
advocating First Amendment protection for speech that is not directed at any
particular employee despite its offensiveness) with Sangree, supra note 107, at
503-58 (taking issue with views of Browne and Volokh and arguing that First
Amendment law is well-suited to the task of distinguishing between constitu-
tionally protected speech from speech constituting unlawful discrimination).
121. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text (describing the facts,
holding, and reasoning of Roberts).
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place, or manner restriction on the speech; whether the regulation
of the speech falls under an exception to the time, place, or manner
requirements; whether the audience is"captive," therebyreducing
the speech's First Amendment protection; and whether the First
Amendment protects the speech as a matter of public concern.
Second, the court should evaluate the government's interest in
cleansing the work environment of sexual harassment by examin-
ing the environment in which the harassment occurred and the
ability of the claimant to escape the objectionable speech.
Separately determining the interests of both the speaker and state
will allow the court to conduct a fact-specific balancing test in each
individual case.
A. THE FREE SPEECH CALCULUS
The first prong of the proposed test involves evaluating the
strength of the harasser's speech interest. Courts have found
speech to be the basis for Title VII violations." Many free
speech advocates disagree with this result," fearing that the
unclear boundaries of the cause of action"2 will lead to abridg-
ment'2 or chilling126 of speech rights. The First Amendment
should not always prevail in the balance between free speech and
sexual harassment claims. Courts can judge the value of a
harasser's speech rights by using a number of criteria to analyze
the speech. Courts can then place the allegedly harassing speech
122. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards provides the best example of speech
serving as the basis for a Title VII violation. See supra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text (describing the pictures of naked women and sexually
derogatory comments that formed the basis for a hostile environment claim).
Robinson also contains the clearest rationale proffered by a court for upholding
Title VII claims in the face of First Amendment defenses. See supra notes 112-
117 and accompanying text (describing the Robinson court's rationale).
123. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 120, at 501-10 (discussing the ways in
which Title VII abridges First Amendment rights); Volokh, supra note 120, at
1809-18 (same).
124. One commentator asserts that the boundaries of the hostile environ-
ment cause of action are "fuzzy" due to the fact-specific nature of each claim.
Professor Carolyn Chalmers, Address at the University of Minnesota Law
School (Oct. 30, 1995). Because each fact situation is different, no clear line
exists to separate meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. Id.
125. A court could abridge free speech rights by holding that the expression
of a certain word or idea constituted harassment.
126. Chilling occurs when a potential speaker does not speak or express an
idea because of a fear or uncertainty that the speech will constitute harassment.
When authorities have too much enforcement discretion, which is arguably the
case in Title VII claims because of the unclear boundaries of the cause of action,
speakers will not express their ideas out of fear of prosecution or suit.
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on a spectrum from highly protected to unprotected, with the
amount of protection accorded that speech commensurate with the
placement of the speech along the spectrum. 2 '
1. Content-Neutrality, Conduct, and Secondary Effects
Government can legitimately abridge free speech rights by
establishing time, place, or manner restrictions. 28  Title VII
satisfies two of the requirements for these restrictions because it
fulfills a significant state interest and does not regulate alternate
avenues of communication. 29 Title VII prohibitions on speech,
however, are not content-neutral. The Robinson court dealt with
this problem by discounting any distinction based on the sexually
explicit nature of pictures and other speech. 30 Contrary to the
court's reasoning, however, prohibiting only offensive or discrimi-
natory speech is content regulation.'
The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish Title VII
from invalid content-based speech restrictions, holding that, while
not content-neutral, Title VII may still be valid under the First
Amendment if it is designed to regulate conduct rather than
127. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and
the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 14 (1994)
("[Tihe set of speech acts that might plausibly be thought to constitute sexual
harassment can be arrayed along a spectrum, not all of which could reasonably
be thought to lie completely beyond First Amendment concern. . . ."); see also
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 165-238
(1989) (discussing the differing protection accorded various types of speech).
128. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (reviewing the require-
ments of a valid time, place, or manner regulation: content neutrality,
significant state interest, and the availability of alternative avenues of
communication).
129. The elimination of sexual harassment seems not just a significant state
interest, but, in fact, a compelling state interest. Plaintiffs can also easily show
that a harasser could have expressed his or her self through alternative
avenues of communication outside the workplace. The harasser, for example,
could have expressed views in such locations as a public park or on a street
corner.
130. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (detailing this finding of the
Robinson court).
131. While the Robinson court found a calendar with naked women sufficient
to constitute harassment, presumably a calendar with pictures of Ronald
Reagan or the Dallas Cowboys would not be harassment. Title VII prohibitions
are therefore not content neutral. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that
language or expression that is offensive cannot be suppressed under the guise
of regulating the time, place, or manner of the speech. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text (detailing Court's holdings in this area).
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speech. 3 2 The amount of protection afforded harassing speech
or expression should, therefore, partially depend upon whether the
speech is tied to harassing conduct. 3 ' General expression in the
workplace that is not directed at any one individual and not tied to
harassing conduct should receive greater protection. Conversely,
offensive speech that is intentionally directed at one individual by
the harasser should receive less protection. 3 4  Although the
Robinson court held sexually explicit expression itself involves
sufficient conduct to avoid the content-neutrality requirement of
a time, place, or manner regulation,' the above distinction is
more consistent with the existing legal framework for First
Amendment law, partly because it closely parallels the common
law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.136 Only
when sexually explicit speech is aimed at an individual, can a
court find sufficient conduct to avoid the content-neutrality
requirement of a time, place, or manner regulation. 3 '
132. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (detailing Supreme Court's
comments on Title VII in RAV. v. City of St. Paul). In R.A.V., the majority
dismissed any application of its holding to Title VII cases, arguing Title VII is
directed at conduct and not speech, and is also constitutional under the
"secondary effects" doctrine. R-.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-90
(1992); Jeffrey M. Laurence, Comment, Minnesota Burning: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul and First Amendment Precedent, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1117, 1143-44
(1994); see also Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment:A Thirteenth Amendment
Response, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 519, 535 (1995) (arguing that Title VII
is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction because speech, rather than
conduct, triggers application of the statute).
133. See Volokh, supra note 120, at 1843-70 (advocating that the line
between undirected and directed speech should serve as the distinction between
speech that is and is not afforded First Amendment protection).
134. Id. Undirected speech occurs, for example, when a harasser states
generally to no one in particular that women are mere sex objects and do not
belong in the workplace. Directed speech, conversely, occurs when the harasser
accosts one particular woman and says to her directly that she is a sex object
and does not belong in the workplace.
135. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (describing the Robinson
court's view that harassing speech is indistinguishable from criminal speech).
136. Under the tort law doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, persons are liable for conduct that they intentionally design to cause,
and that does cause, very serious mental distress to targeted individuals. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 89, at 54-66 (describing the common law cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Despite the technical
requirement that the actor intend to inflict emotional distress, most if not all
jurisdictions have chosen to impose civil liability where the conduct in question
is sufficiently outrageous regardless of the actor's intent. Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1988).
137. Hanging a calendar on the wall, for example, would not be "significant
action" under this test. By examining whether expression is directed at an
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Title VII also can qualify for an exception to the content-
neutrality requirement of a time, place, or manner regulation if
the intent of the regulation is to control the secondary effects of the
speech.138 The primary consideration for determining the pro-
tection afforded speech under this exception is the primary and
secondary effects of the speech. The emotive impact of harassing
speech on a victim is a primary, not a secondary effect.'39 If the
only effect of the harassment on the victim is emotional unrest,
therefore, the exception should not apply. If, alternatively, the
harassment leads to impaired work performance, a nonemotional
repercussion, the harassment arguablyhas controllable secondary
effects. The greater the non-emotive effects, the less protection
courts should afford the harassing speech or expression. While
emotional unrest alone may intrinsically impact job performance,
the Supreme Court has allowed governmental control over only
secondary effects, and not the emotive impact of speech. The reach
of the secondary effects doctrine in preventing sexually harassing
speech is therefore limited. 4 °
2. Captive Audience Considerations
Courts have upheld speech regulations when an audience is
"captive," and unable to'escape the objectionable speech.'' The
Robinson court, for example, concluded that employees at the
shipyard were a captive audience because their job forced them to
remain at the site of the harassment.' While some commenta-
individual, on the other hand, a court can ensure that conduct will be
sufficiently egregious to invoke the exception to the content-neutrality
requirement of a time, place, or manner regulation. Singling out one individual
and harassing only that person surely involves significant action.
138. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (describing the secondary
effects exception to the content-neutrality requirement of a time, place, or
manner regulation).
'139. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1992) (determining
that an ordinance proscribing certain types of hate speech was not directed to
secondary effects within the meaning of Renton); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988) ("Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of'secondary effects'
we referred to in Renton.").
140. See Fallon, supra note 127, at 17-18 (arguing that harassment law
cannot qualify for the "secondary effects" exception to the content-neutrality
principle because harassment law focuses on the direct impact of speech on its
audience).
141. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (detailing the captive
audience doctrine).
142. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
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tors doubt whether this doctrine should shield individuals from
speech when they are outside of their homes,'" the inability of
employees to avoid objectionable speech in the workplace is
analogous to their inability to avoid such speech at home, render-
ing them a captive audience. In assessing the protection speech
should receive, therefore, the less an employee is able to escape
harassing speech, the less protection courts should afford that
speech.'" Captive audience arguments should at least be a
factor, even if not determinative, in assessing the speech rights of
a harasser.
3. The Public Concern Test
Speech considered harassment under Title VII may in fact be
a comment upon a matter of public concern.'45 This is especially
true in light of courts' broad interpretation of "public concern.""
Many hostile environment sexual harassment plaintiffs, for
example, base their claims upon male co-workers' comments about
the appropriateness of women in the workplace or the suitability
of women to perform a particular job."' While these comments
may have a harassing effect on female workers, the fact that they
touch upon issues of public concern'48 should afford them a
certain degree of First Amendment protection. Although an
employer's interest in an efficient workplace ultimately can
outweigh the employee's speech rights,'49 courts should consider
143. Compare J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (arguing
that few audiences are more captive than the average worker) with Volokh,
supra note 120, at 1832-33 (arguing that the Supreme Court should not find
that employees in the workplace are "captive").
144. Whether workers are "captive" at their place of employment is also an
element of the second part of the proposed test, assessing the strength of the
government's interest in eliminating harassment in a particular case. See infra
Part HI.B.2. (proposing an analysis akin to the captive audience doctrine).
145. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (detailing the public
concern test).
146. See supra note 50 (describing the broad reading given to the term
"public concern" by lower courts).
147. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d. 591,
595 (5th Cir.) ("Physically, the police broads just don't got it!"), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 473 (1995); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1498
(M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[T]here's nothing worse than having to work around
women.").
148. For example, the question of whether women belong in the work force
or are physically fit to perform a certain job are issues of public concern.
149. See supra note 48-49 and accompanying text (describing the balancing
test courts use when a public employee's speech touches upon a matter of public
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whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern.
B. STRENGTH OF THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN REGULATING
HARASSING SPEECH
The second part of the proposed test involves measuring the
strength of the government interest in eradicating sexual harass-
ment. In fulfilling this task, the court should use a two-step
analysis. The court first should examine whether the harassment
occurred in an employment, scholastic, or other environment.
Then, within such an environment, the court should examine the
ability of the claimant to escape the objectionable speech by using
a captive audience analysis. Such a case-specific analysis will
allow a court to determine the strength of the government interest
in censuring the questioned speech.
1. The Location of Sexually Harassing Speech or Expression
The state's interest in eradicating sexual harassment is most
compelling when harassing speech occurs in the workplace.
150
Over the past twenty-five years the number of women in the work
force has roughly doubled' and an increasing number of women
workers are the sole income earners in their household.'52 If the
victim loses or leaves her job, and the victim is the sole wage
earner in the household, the income needed to support dependents
is no longer available. Sexual harassment in the workplace thus
endangers the livelihood of not only the victim, but those depen-
dent on the victim as well. 53
concern).
150. The government's interest in eliminating harassment in the workplace
is compelling because of the large number of women now in the work force and
the increased responsibility of many of these women as the heads of single
family households to provide for dependents. See infra notes 151-52 and
accompanying text (providing statistics of the number of women in the work
force).
151. The number of females in the civilian labor force has increased from
31,543,000 in 1970 to 58,407,000 in 1993. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 398 (1994).
152. While the number of married women in the work force increased 73%
from 1970 to 1993 (from 18,475,000 to 31,978,000), the number of widowed,
separated, or divorced women increased over 100% (from 5,804,000 to
11,805,000) over the same period. Id. at 401. Thus, an increasing percentage
of women in the work force are responsible for providing for dependents.
153. In enacting Title VII, Congress intended to remove barriers to
employment based on race or sex. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469,
1483 (3rd Cir. 1990). InAndrews, the court held that Congress's objective "can
only be achieved if women are allowed to work without being harassed. Women
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In contrast, the equality interest at stake when sexual
harassment occurs in non-workplace environments is not as
compelling, as no threat to the livelihood of the wage earner or
dependents occurs. The college campus is a ready example. One
purpose of a university, unlike the workplace, is to foster the free
exchange of ideas that may be controversial or even offensive.'
University sexual harassment codes prohibiting offensive speech
ignore this fundamental difference between the workplace and
campus environment.'55 Sexual harassment can occur in other
situations as well, such as those involving public transportation
and public sidewalks. In both locations, the public nature of the
forum lessens the state's interest in avoiding harassment. Ineach
case, the court should consider the relative importance ofeliminat-
ing harassment in that particular location.
2. The Ability to Escape the Sexually Harassing Speech or
Expression
While a victim ofsexualharassment in many situations is able
to avoid harassment altogether, 56 in the case of the workplace
the victim is often unable to escape the objectionable conduct or
expression. 57 Because the harasser may control the conditions
of the victim's employment, the victim is forced to endure sexual
harassment in order to keep his or her job.
Not all employment relationships, however, are equally
who know that they will be subject to harassment will be deterred from joining
the work force or accepting certain jobs." Id.
154. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(holding that tolerating offensive speech acquires "a special significance in the
University setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views
is essential to the institution's educational mission.").
155. In Doe, the court struck down the University of Michigan's speech code
because it regulated purely expressive behavior and speech unrelated to
conduct. Id. at 863-64. The court further held that the code was overbroad and
vague. Id. at 866-67.
156. If, for example, a victim is subject to harassment while walking down
a particular street or while shopping in a particular store, in the future that
person is free to choose an alternate route or a different store.
157. It is much more difficult for a victim of sexual harassment to quit a job
and find a new position in order to escape harassment than to choose a new
walking route or store. The harasser may be the victim's supervisor, who holds
power over the victim both during the term of employment and even after
employment is terminated if the victim needs a reference to obtain new
employment. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 66, at 25-55 (describing the




susceptible to sexually harassing speech or expression. In
determining susceptibility, and concomitantly the strength of the
equalityinterest in a particular case, courts shoulduse an analysis
akin to the captive audience doctrine. Under that doctrine, courts
provide less protection to speech rights when the speech is directed
toward a captive audience.' Courts should determine the
strength of the State's interest in eliminating sexual harassment
in a particular case by examining the captivity of the target of
harassment.'59 When the employee is unable to escape the
harassing behavior, the State's interest is most compelling. 6 ' If
the employee has the ability to escape the harassing speech,'
61
however, the interests of the government become less compelling.
C. APPLYING THE PROPOSED BALANCING TEST TO DEANGELIS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed DeAngelis's
claim because of insufficient evidence of sexual harassment.'62
If the court had reached the merits of the sexual harassment-free
speech conflict, however, application of the proposed balancing test
would have lead to a similar result. In determining the strength
of the speech interest in that case, the interest of the Association
in printing its newspaper was strong. Because no harassing
conduct accompanied the speech, Title VII in that case could not be
a valid time, place, or manner regulation of conduct. While
DeAngelis claimed emotional disturbance from the newsletter, she
did not present evidence of secondary effects from the articles such
as deterioration in job performance. In addition, the newspaper
158. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court's captive audience doctrine).
159. Captive audience considerations are also a factor in the first prong of
the proposed test, determining the strength of the harasser's First Amendment
interests in making the harassing statements. See supra Part III.A.2.
(discussing captive audience considerations).
160. An employee is a "captive audience," for example, when he or she is
desk-bound and unable to complete his or her work outside of the location in
which the harassing behavior occurs. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490-94 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (providing an example
of an employee unable to complete her work outside of the location in which the
harassing behavior occurs).
161. An employee can escape harassing speech when the employee is able to
complete her work at home just as easily as at the place where the objectionable
speech occurs. An employee is clearly not a captive audience if she is able to
choose not to come to the site of the harassment without negatively impacting
her work or her career. In actuality, very few such employment situations exist.
162. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (detailing the facts and
holding of DeAngelis).
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columns focused on a matter of public concern, the presence of
women on the El Paso police force.
Conversely, the strength of the government's interest in
eradicating sex harassment in this situation was weak. While the
speech occurred in a workplace forum, DeAngelis had the ability
to escape the harassing speech or expression by simply avoiding
the Association's newspaper, thereby making her a non-captive
audience. Weighing the relative interests in this case, therefore,
compels the conclusion that the Association's First Amendment
interest in printing its newspaper outweighed the government's
interest in eliminatingthe newspaper's sexuallyharassing speech.
CONCLUSION
The fact-specific nature of Title VII hostile environment
claims presents difficult challenges for the courts. Fortunately,
the conflictbetween the First Amendment and Title VII implicates
only a relatively narrow class of harassment claims, where pure
expression is the basis for the complaint. As the cause of action
expands, however, the basis of a growing number of harassment
claims is likely to include speech or expressive activity.
The refusal of the Supreme Court to address the First
Amendment issue indicates that the Court will not find that the
First Amendment prohibits the imposition of Title VII liability
altogether when speech is both expressive and sexually harassing.
The prior holdings of the Court dealing with content neutrality,
captive audiences, secondary effects, and public employment,
however, indicate that some harassing speech deserves First
Amendment protection, even though listeners may find it offen-
sive.
As Title VII liability has expanded, courts have been slow to
address the types of speech that deserve protection and whether
the First Amendment should serve as a meritorious defense to a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim. This Note proposes
a structured balancing test to determine the relative importance
of free speech and equality rights when a Title VII hostile environ-
ment claim is met with a First Amendment defense. This test
weighs the interest of a speaker in self-expression against the
strength of the government interest in eliminating sexual
harassment in a particular context. Because of the nature of the
speech involved in such a case, this test is more efficient than
trying to strictly classify the speech as protected or unprotected.
This approach allows courts to utilize discretion in weighing all of
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the interests at stake andinsures the properbalance between Title
VII and the First Amendment right to free speech.
